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CRIMINAL LAW-FAILED THE
BREATHALYZER? JUST CONTEST THE
LOCATION OF THE STOP-COMMONWEALTH V
VIRGILIO, 947 N.E.2D 1112 (MASS. APP. CT. 2011)
In Massachusetts, the criminal act of driving under the influence of
an intoxicating liquor or controlled substance is governed by Massachusetts
General Laws Chapter 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (the "Massachusetts OUI
Statute").'

In Commonwealth v. Virgilio,2 the Massachusetts Appeals

Court considered whether the common area entryways and parking zones
of multiple unit residential buildings constitute "any place to which
members of the public have access as invitees or licensees" within the
meaning of the Massachusetts OUI Statute. 3 The court determined that
members of the public would neither deem the driveway and conjoining
parking lot as anything other than a private driveway nor infer that public
use is invited and, therefore, it is not a place to which members of the
public have access as invitees or licensees as provided by the governing
statutory language. 4
On May 16, 2009, Lisa Virgilio, while intoxicated, got into her car
and backed into the side of her neighbor's car.5 At the time, Virgilio was
residing in a single family cottage located adjacent to the two-story, twofamily dwelling where the owner of the other vehicle in the accident
resided. 6 The incident occurred in a parking area located behind the two
residences.7 The parking area extended from a paved driveway traveling
between the two residences stemming from a wide-mouthed entryway

1

See MASS.

GEN.

LAWS ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (2010). The three elements of operating under

the influence are (1) operating a motor vehicle, (2) upon any way or in any place to which the
public has a right of access, or upon any way or in any place to which members of the public have
access as invitees or licensees, and (3) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. See id.
2 947 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011).
3 Id. at 1114 (outlining issue).
4 Id. at 1115 (setting forth holding). The court reasoned that because the location in which
the Defendant was operating her motor vehicle is not governed by chapter 90, section 24(1)(a)(1)
of the Massachusetts General Laws, she could not have been charged with operating under the
influence of an intoxicating liquor and her motion for a required finding of not guilty should have
been allowed. Id. at 1116.
5Id. at 1113 n.3.
6 Id. at 1113-14.
7 Virgilio, 947 N.E.2d at 1114. There was ample space to accommodate six to eight parked
vehicles in the parking area. Id. at 1117 (Sikora, J., dissenting).
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leading from the main road.8
All occupants of the two properties had access to the driveway and
parking area and none of the residents could restrict access. 9 Additionally,
there were no barriers or signs at the mouth of the entryway, nor were there
any markings or partitions which separated any of the paved area spanning
from the entryway from the main road through the parking area.'0 Any
visitors travelling by motor vehicle seeking to visit the occupants of either
building would drive through the entryway and park in the area located
behind the residences."
At trial, the sole issue was whether the location in which Virgilio
was operating her motor vehicle was a "way or... place to which members
of the public have access as invitees or licensees." 12 The trial judge denied
Virgilio's motion for a required finding of not guilty and convicted her of
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor.' 3
Virgilio appealed this conviction, claiming the place on which she was
operating her vehicle was not a way or place to which members of the
public have access as invitees or licensees and, therefore, was not within
the reach of the Massachusetts OUI Statute.' 4
On appeal, the
Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed Virgilio's conviction, finding that
relevant case law had not extended the governing statute's reach to all
places in which an operator may have physical access.' 5 Furthermore, the
court found that the lower court should have allowed Virgilio's motion for
a required finding of not guilty because members of the public could
not
16
conclude the area was open to them for travel as invitees or licensees.
Under its original language, the Massachusetts OUI Statute applied
only to operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence "upon any
way or in any place to which the public has a right of access."' 7 The

8 Id. at 1114 (majority opinion); see also id.at 1117 (Sikora, J., dissenting) (describing how

to access parking area in which accident occurred).
9 Id. at 1117 (Sikora, J., dissenting).
10 Id. (illustrating ease of access to parking area).
11Id. (demonstrating possible travelers on driveway and in parking area not limited to
building's residents).
12 Virgilio, 947 N.E.2d at 1114 (omission in original). At trial, the defendant did not dispute

that she was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. See id. at 1113 n.3.
13 See id. at 1113.
14 Id. Virgilio also contested her sentence, claiming it was excessive. Id. The majority
did

not address the issue of excessive punishment because it had reversed her conviction. Id. n.2.
15 Id. at 1115-16.
16 Id. at 1115-16 (stating appeals court holding).
17 Commonwealth v. Smithson, 672 N.E.2d 16, 20 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (highlighting
language in original statute); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (1937) (setting forth
language in statute before 1961 amendment).
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legislature enacted this original version of the statute to protect those
traveling upon highways and it was not intended to criminalize operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated in all places within the Commonwealth. 8
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") interpreted this
language of the statute to include only public ways or ways in which the
general public held an easement, not privately owned places used by the
general public solely as licensees or business invitees. 19
Responding to the SJC's interpretation of this language, the
legislature amended the statute in 1961 to add "any place to which
members of the public have access as invitees or licensees., 20 The purpose
behind the statute is to address the dangerous risk of impaired driving while
attempting to remedy the situation through deterrence, incapacitation, and
reformation of the offender. 2' While the case law has not extended the

18 Commonwealth v. Clarke, 150 N.E. 829, 830 (Mass. 1926) (indicating purpose and
limitations of statute).
19 Commonwealth v. Paccia, 153 N.E.2d 664, 666 (Mass. 1958) (announcing areas
encompassed under statute). The court went on to state that 'Ji]f the legislature had wished to
include areas like [the area at issue], to which members of the public have access only as business
invitees or licensees, within the penal prohibitions of § 24, it would have been appropriate for it
to have made a clear and specific provision to this effect." Id. at 666.
20 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (2010) (detailing language added in revised
1994 statute). This revision has been the subject of several opinions. See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. George, 550 N.E.2d 138, 140-41 (Mass. 1990) (holding public school baseball field not
covered by statute); Commonwealth v. Cabral, 931 N.E.2d 44, 46-47 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010)
(characterizing avenue lined with single family homes as public way); Commonwealth v.
Stoddard, 905 N.E.2d 114, 117 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) (rejecting unpaved, unilluminated,
unsigned roadways of gated campground as being way or place under statute); Commonwealth v.
Brown, 748 N.E.2d 972, 981 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (finding roads admitting certified individuals
to gated military installation covered by statute); Smithson, 672 N.E.2d at 20-21 (holding gated
road leading into sand pit not covered by statute); Commonwealth v. Muise, 551 N.E.2d 1224,
1225-26 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (finding paved private way leading into trailer park covered by
statute); Commonwealthv. Hart, 525 N.E.2d 1345, 1347 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988) (declaring private
way extending from public road with business outlets covered by statute).
21 See Commonwealthv. Blais, 701 N.E.2d 314, 317 (Mass. 1998) ("A drunk driver let loose
on the highways is a deadly menace... to anyone sharing the highways with him.");
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 319 N.E.2d 901, 903 (Mass. 1974) (noting impaired drivers likely to
kill themselves or others); Commonwealth v. Davis, 823 N.E.2d 411, 413 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)
(recognizing driving under influence presents grave danger to public); Commonwealth v.
Fortune, 785 N.E.2d 1274, 1275 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (acknowledging impaired driving affects
safety of public and must be investigated by police); see also ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (setting forth
sentencing of license revocation, incarceration and treatment programs). The statute prescribes
graduated punishments for multiple offenses. Ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1). Multiple offenders are
subject to mandatory license revocation, increasing in duration for each subsequent offense. Id.
§ 24(1)(b). Additionally, offenders could face up to two and one-half years in the house of
corrections for a first offense and up to five years for a fifth offense. Id. § 24(1)(a)(1). A judge
may also require an offender to undergo a residential treatment program. Id. Efforts to stop
drunk driving have been seen at both the state and national level through various public
awareness campaigns and the expenditure of millions of dollars by both the government and
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statute's reach to all places that an operator may have physical access, the
1961 revision expanded the scope of the statute to include a greater number
of possible offenders, and it illustrated the legislature's intent to further the
underlying public safety concern inherent in the statute.22
When assessing whether a particular private way is encompassed

under the revised statute, it is the status of the way, not the status of the
driver, which is controlling.23 Consequently, an impaired driver can be
charged under the statute even if that driver does not have a specific license

or invitation to be traveling on the way.24 The operative test is whether the
invitation or license is one that extends-or appears, from the character of
the way, to extend-to the general public.25

private organizations.
TREATMENT OF THE

See, e.g.,

DWI

ALAN

A.

CAVAIOLA &

OFFENDER 30-31 (2002)

CHARLES WUTH, ASSESSMENT AND

(stating public pressured legislature for

harsher OUI laws because of increasing drunk driving deaths); Kelly Mahon Tullier, Note,
GovernmentalLiabilityforNegligent Failureto Detain Drunk Drivers,77 CORNELL L. REv. 873,
873 & n.7 (noting almost every state has passed stricter OUI laws, including mandatory
sentencing,
since
1980);
Campaign to
Eliminate Drunk
Driving, MADD,
http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving/campaign/ (last visited May 30, 2012) (providing example of
public awareness campaign).
22 See Commonwealth v. George, 550 N.E.2d 138, 139 (Mass. 1990) ("We read G.L. c. 90,
§ 24(1)(a)(1), as reaching only those places to which members of the public have a right of access
by motor vehicle or access as invitees or licensees by a motor vehicle."); see also ch. 90,
§ 24(1)(a)(1) (providing increased number of areas encompassed under statute). Not only has the
scope of the location in which an individual can be charged with an OUI been widened, stricter
standards have also been applied to determine whether someone is "operating" a motor vehicle
and whether someone is in fact "under the influence." See Holly Hinte, Note, Drunk Drivers and
Vampire Cops: The "GoldStandard," 37 NEW ENG. J. ON CRlMI. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 159, 161
(2011) ("[AIll States have passed 'illegal per se' laws that make it a crime to operate a motor

vehicle with [blood alcohol content] at or above .08 ....
" (quoting

NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC

U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., REFUSAL OF INTOXICATION TESTING: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS 2 (2008))); see also Commonwealth v. McGillivary, 940 N.E.2d 506, 509 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2011) (finding defendant operating when slumped over wheel and ignition turned to
"on" but engine off).
23 Commonwealthv. Hart, 525 N.E.2d 1345, 1347 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988) (detailing
elements
to consider when determining whether conduct falls under prohibitions in statute).
24 See Brown, 748 N.E.2d at 979 (reiterating status of driver irrelevant to determination).
25 See Commonwealth v. Stoddard, 905 N.E.2d 114, 116-17 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) (citing
SAFETY ADMIN.,

test used to assess whether private way covered by statute). The way will not be covered by the
statute if the license or invitation is privately extended to a limited class. Id. at 117. The
subjective intent of the property owner is irrelevant when determining the status of the way; the
determination depends upon the way's objective appearance. See Commonwealth v. Smithson,
672 N.E.2d 16, 19 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). While typical physical attributes of a public way may
help decipher whether a way is accessible to the public under the statute, a lack of these
characteristics is not dispositive. See Smithson, 672 N.E.2d at 20 (finding unpaved way leading
into business not covered by statute on weekend when business closed); Commonwealth v.
Muise, 551 N.E.2d 1224, 1225-26 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (concluding paved private road without
curbing entering into trailer park covered by statute). But see Commonwealth v. Kiss, 794
N.E.2d 1281, 1283 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) ("The characteristics of the [place in question], even
during the hours that the mall shops are closed, place the parking lot within reach of G.L. c. 90,
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In Commonwealth v. Virgilio, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
considered whether the common area entryways and parking zones of
multiple unit residential buildings constitute "any place to which members
of the public have access as invitees or licensees" within the meaning of the
Massachusetts OUI Statute. 26 The court applied the test set forth in
Commonwealth v. Stoddard27 in determining whether the way fell within
the bounds of the statute: "if the invitation or license is one that extends (or
appears, from the character of the way, to extend) to the general public, the
way is covered. 2
In applying this test, the court determined that the
physical accessibility of the driveway and parking area by occupants of two
residential buildings was not enough to bring the way under the statute's
reach. 29 The court then concluded that members of the public could not
reasonably believe that the driveway was open to them for travel as invitees

or licensees.3 0
In Commonwealth v. Virgilio, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
incorrectly determined that the area in which Virgilio was operating her
motor vehicle was not a way or place as provided by the Massachusetts

OUI Statute. 3'

In its analysis, the majority employed strict statutory

§ 24 .... While the use of the parking lot after closing hours would be significantly diminished,
there were services at the mall, such as pay telephones and newspaper distribution
boxes .... [T]heir presence created the reasonable expectation among members of the public that
they were welcome to operate their vehicles in the parking lot in order to access those services
that were uniquely available when the shops were closed.").
26 947 N.E.2d at 1114 (describing issue before court).
27 905 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009).
28 Id. at 1115 (quoting Stoddard, 905 N.E.2d at 117). While the court acknowledged that
there are some typical physical circumstances that may help determine whether a way is covered
under the statute, it stated that these characteristics are not dispositive. Id. at 1115. Some of the
physical circumstances that the court mentioned were the presence of street lights, hydrants,
curbing, and paving. Id.
29 See Virgilio, 947 N.E.2d at 1116. In its analysis, the court characterized the way
as a
private driveway and parking area that only served two residences and noted that it neither
contained nor led to any businesses nor public accommodations. Id. at 1115.
30 Id. at 1115. The court stated that there was nothing in the appearance of the way that
would lead members of the general public to believe that it was anything other than a private
driveway or that public use was invited. Id. at 1115. The court further stated that if it had ruled
otherwise, it would overrule the test set forth in Stoddard and would essentially be reading the
word "public" out of the statute. Id. at 1116. The court also noted that although the driveway
was neither gated nor posted, there was nothing in the appearance of the way that would give an
impression to the general public that public use was invited. Id. at 1115.
31 See Virgilio, 947 N.E.2d at 1118 (Sikora, J., dissenting) (finding majority erred in
determining place at issue not covered by statute). The language of the statute, the underlying
purpose of the statute, and the legislative intent in amending the statute to include the clause at
issue all undercut the majority's position. See MASS. GEN. LAWs ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (2010);
see also Commonwealth v. Connolly, 474 N.E.2d 1106, 1109 (Mass. 1985) ("[The Massachusetts
OUI Statute must be read] in light of the legislative purpose to protect the public from drivers
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interpretation and surveyed existing precedent, failing to recognize that the

question presented before the court was a significant issue of first
impression.32 The pertinent issue of whether the common area entryways
and parking zones of multiple residential buildings fall within the
Massachusetts OUI Statute as "any place to which members of the public
have access as invitees or licensees" has not been addressed in any of the

established case law of Massachusetts.33
In concluding that the common area entryways and parking zones
of multiple residential buildings did not fall within the bounds of the
statute, the majority utilized an unreasonably narrow interpretation of the
phrase "any place to which members of the public have access as invitees
or licensees."34 The court established an overly constricted definition of
"invitee or licensee," excluding specific invitees or licensees from the

statute where the language of the statute does not call for such an
omission. 35

The Massachusetts Legislature added the specific portion of

whose judgment, alertness, and ability to respond promptly and effectively to unexpected
emergencies are diminished because of the consumption of alcohol."); see also Commonwealth v.
Paccia, 153 N.E.2d 664, 666 (Mass. 1958) (prompting legislature to enact 1961 amendment).
32 See Virgilio, 947 N.E.2d at 1114-16 (describing court's interpretation of statute and use of
existing case law to support holding); id. at 1116-17 (Sikora, J., dissenting) (characterizing issue
before the court as a matter of first impression).
33 Id. at 1116-17 (Sikora, J., dissenting) (finding issue lies open for analysis). The
case law
cited by the majority does not address the question at issue. See Commonwealth v. George, 550
N.E.2d 138, 140-41 (Mass. 1990) (determining public school baseball field not covered by
statute); see also Commonwealth v. Cabral, 931 N.E.2d 44, 46-47 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010)
(characterizing avenue lined with single family homes as public way); Stoddard, 905 N.E.2d at
117 (rejecting unpaved, unilluminated, unsigned roadways of gated campground as being way or
place under statute); Commonwealth v. Brown, 748 N.E.2d 972, 981 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001)
(holding roads admitting certified individuals to gated military installation covered by statute);
Commonwealth v. Smithson, 672 N.E.2d 16, 21 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (declaring gated road
leading into sand pit not covered by statute); Commonwealth v. Muise, 551 N.E.2d 1224, 122526 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (holding paved private way leading into trailer park covered by statute);
Commonwealth v. Hart, 525 N.E.2d 1345, 1347 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988) (finding private way
extending from public road with business outlets covered by statute). Arguably, the most similar
circumstances to the case at bar were set forth in Muise where the defendant was operating his
motorcycle on the entryway of a trailer park. See 551 N.E.2d at 1225-26. Like the area in
question in Virgilio, the way led from a main road into a residential area, was paved but contained
no curbing, and had no signs prohibiting the public from accessing the road. Id. at 1225. In
Muise, the court determined that "the physical circumstances of the way are such that members of
the public may reasonably conclude that it is open for travel to invitees or licensees" thereby
bringing the way within the bounds of the statute. Id. at 1225-26 (quoting Hart, 525 N.E.2d at
1347).
34 See Virgilio, 947 N.E.2d at 1115 (noting if license or invitation is extended to limited
class, way not covered by statute). But see ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (addressing members of public as
whole, and not excluding ways merely accessed by limited class).
31 See ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (exhibiting language of statute, which includes individuals of
public specifically invited to travel on way). The language of the Massachusetts OUI Statute
does not indicate "that a specific invitee or licensee, as distinguished from a random invitee or
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the statute at issue in Virgilio in response to the SJC's narrow interpretation
in Commonwealth v. Paccia,36 in which the SJC determined that the statute
encompassed only private ways where the general public held an
easement. 37 The decision in Virgilio once again employs an overly narrow
interpretation of the Massachusetts OUI Statute and undercuts the
legislature's goal of deterring deter drunk driving in the Commonwealth,
overlooking the strong public safety purpose inherent in the statute .38
Not only is the Massachusetts Appeals Court's decision at odds
with the language, purpose, and intent of the Massachusetts OUI Statute,
the precedent the decision establishes contradicts the strict standards
applied to the remaining elements of the Massachusetts OUI Statute.39
While the standard applied in determining whether an individual is
"operating" a motor vehicle or "under the influence" has become harsher

licensee, no longer qualifies as a 'member[] of the public."' Virgilio, 947 N.E.2d at 1118-19 &
n.3, 1123 (Sikora, J., dissenting) ("A specific invitee or licensee would be a person driving onto
the 'place' for a particular purpose, such as a social guest, a deliveryman, or visiting nurse ....
").
The way or place is encompassed in the statute if any member of the public has access to the way
or place as an invitee or licensee; whether the person was specifically invited or given permission
to travel on the way is irrelevant. See ch.90, § 24(1)(a)(1). The court erroneously focused on the
purpose of the driver in travelling on the way instead of the accessibility of the place in
determining whether the way is covered by the statute. Virgilio, 947 N.E.2d at 1118.
16 153 N.E.2d 664 (Mass. 1958).
17 See id.at 666. While the court in Paccia conditioned its decision by stating that the
legislature would have included the phrase "business invitees or licensees" in the statute if it
intended to include the area at issue in Paccia, the legislature opted to leave out the term
"business" and amended the statute to include the unmodified phrase "invitees or licensees." See
ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1); Paccia, 153 N.E.2d at 666 ("If the legislature had wished to include areas
like [the place at issue], to which members of the public have access only as business invitees or
licensees, within the penal prohibitions of § 24, it would have been appropriate for it to have
made a clear and specific provision to this effect."). In Massachusetts, the phrase "invitees or
licensees" includes both business and social visitors. See Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 5052 (Mass. 1973).
38 See Virgilio, 947 N.E.2d at 1115-16 (stating narrow interpretation of Massachusetts OUI
statute); see also ch. 90, § 24 (displaying how amendment expanded chargeable class);
Commonwealth v. Sudderth, 640 N.E.2d 481, 483 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (declaring purpose of
Massachusetts OUI Statute is to deter individuals from driving while intoxicated). Congress and
state legislatures have been passing stricter drunk driving laws in response to the number of
deaths occurring as a result of impaired driving, supporting a broad application of the
Massachusetts OUI Statute. See CAVAIOLA & WUTH, supra note 21, at 30-31 (stating public
pressured legislature to create harsher OUI laws because of number of drunk driving deaths);
Tullier, supra note 21, at 873 & n.7 (noting almost every state has passed stricter OUI laws,
including mandatory sentencing, since 1980).
39 See ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (setting forth "operate" and "under the influence" as two other
elements in OUI statute); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24 (1937) (exhibiting that before
Massachusetts met national standard of .08, legal limit was .10); Commonwealth v. McGillivary,
940 N.E.2d 506, 509 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (finding defendant operating when ignition turned to
"on" but engine off); Hinte, supra note 22, at 161 (noting all states criminalize operating vehicle
with blood alcohol content of .08 or greater).
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after public awareness and drunk driving deaths have increased, the
location in which one can be charged with drunk driving is incongruent
with Massachusetts's ever-increasing admonishment of the practice of
driving while intoxicated.4 0 The Virgilio decision has further narrowed the
possible locations encompassed under the Massachusetts OUI statute for an
offense to occur. 4' Although the area at issue in this case served only two
residential buildings, the court's reasoning and analysis applies to much
larger residential areas such as condominium complexes and apartment
building parking areas, opening the door to a far greater number of
individuals who will be in danger of injury or death when an impaired
driver decides to travel
throughout the common areas of these multiple
42
resident complexes.
In Commonwealth v. Virgilio, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
considered whether the common area entryways and parking zones of
multiple unit residential buildings constitute "any place to which members
of the public have access as invitees or licensees" within the meaning of the
Massachusetts OUI Statute. The Court determined that members of the
public would not deem the driveway and conjoining parking lot as anything
other than a private driveway or infer that public use is invited and,
therefore, it is not a place to which members of the public have access as
invitees or licensees as provided by the governing statutory language. In its
decision, the appeals court erroneously relied on precedent that does not
address the question at bar. The Virgilio decision is directly at odds with
the language of the Massachusetts OUI Statute and the Massachusetts
Legislature's inherent intent to safeguard the public. The overly narrow
interpretation of the public access clause undercuts the legislature's goal of
reducing the frequency of impaired driving by attempting to deter such
conduct throughout the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Jillise Ketcham

40 See Virgilio, 947 N.E.2d at 1121-22 (Sikora, J., dissenting) (highlighting inconsistencies in
lenity among three elements of OUI offense).
41 See id. at 1116 (majority opinion).
42 See id. at 1115 (stating area in question was private driveway). The court's main rationale

for its holding was that the driveway and parking area only served two residences, containing
three dwelling units in total, with no businesses or public accommodations. Id. As this area
shares the same characteristics as larger scale housing units, it would follow that the same
rationale would be applied to these more populated living complexes. See id. at 1123 (Sikora, J.,
dissenting) (comparing residential area in question to larger scale condominium complexes or
apartment buildings).

